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RUNNING HEAD: Science or pseudoscience? 
Abstract 
Scientific knowledge has been a significant contributor to the development of better practices 
within law enforcement agencies. However, some alleged ‘experts’ have also been shown to 
have disseminated to police officers, lawyers and judges, information that is neither empirically 
tested nor supported by scientific theory. The aim of this article is threefold: to provide 
organisations within the justice system an overview of a) what science is and what it is not, b) 
what constitutes empirically driven, theoretically founded and peer reviewed approaches, and c) 
how to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Using examples in relation to nonverbal 
communication, we aim to exemplify how not everything presented as comprehensively 
evaluated is methodologically reliable for use in the justice system. 
 




RUNNING HEAD: Science or pseudoscience? 
Science or pseudoscience? A distinction that matters for police officers, lawyers and judges 
Scientific knowledge has been a significant contributor to the development of better 
practices within law enforcement agencies. Academics often collaborate with various agencies to 
evaluate and advise upon empirically or theoretically supported approaches which support the 
pursuit of justice (e.g., The High Value Detainee Interrogation Group [HIG], Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2018). They are often called to provide expert testimony within criminal trials 
(Brodsky, 2013) and can be key advisors to both prosecutors and defence lawyers. 
However, some alleged ‘experts’ have also been shown to have disseminated ambiguous 
information to members of the justice community; that is, information that is neither empirically 
tested nor supported by scientific theory (e.g., Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008). Because of a lack 
of scientific literacy (e.g., Fraigman, 2006; Moreno, 2003; Redding, Floyd, & Hawk, 2001; 
Tadei, Finnilä, Reite, Antfolk, & Santtila, 2016), and clear guidance on how to differentiate what 
science is and what it is not, individuals within the justice system may not have the required 
information which allows them to identify questionable information, or even pseudoscience. 
Pseudoscience has been referred to as the romanticism of science and is often based on little 
more than myths and legends (Allchin, 2004): 
Pseudoscience is necessarily defined by its relation to science and typically involves 
subjects that are either on the margins or borderlands of science and are not yet proven, 
or have been disproven, or make claims that sound scientific but in fact have no 
relationship to science (Shermer, 2013, p. 203).  
Therefore, understanding what pseudoscience is, and how to distinguish it from science, 
is crucial in evaluating approaches presented by so-called experts. It is also required as a means 
to develop better professional practice. In addition, the use of pseudoscience by members of the 
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justice community can result in adverse human, social and economic consequences (i.e., Denault 
& Jupe, 2017; Kageleiry, 2007; Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008; Makgoba, 2002; White, 2014).  
However, despite the rising popularity of pseudoscience (Heller, 2017), the justice system 
does not have a standardised advisory system which informs police officers, lawyers and judges 
on how to differentiate science from pseudoscience. The aim of this article is threefold: to 
provide organisations within the justice system an overview of a) what science is and what it is 
not, b) what constitutes empirically driven, theoretically founded and peer reviewed approaches, 
and c) how to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Using examples in relation to nonverbal 
communication, we aim to exemplify how not everything presented as comprehensively 
evaluated is methodologically reliable for use in the justice system.  
How to distinguish ‘nonscience’ from science 
Philosophers nowadays recognize that there is no sharp line dividing sense from 
nonsense, and moreover that doctrines starting out in one camp may over time evolve 
into the other. For example, alchemy was a (somewhat) legitimate science in the times of 
Newton and Boyle, but it is now firmly pseudoscientific (movements in the opposite 
direction, from full-blown pseudoscience to genuine science, are notably rare). (Pigliucci 
& Boudry, 2013b, para. 12). 
Whilst distinguishing pseudoscience from science can be difficult, there are methods to 
aid in making a distinction. For example, several indicators which would be suggestive of 
‘nonscience’ have been suggested, such as a lack of falsifiability, misuse of scientific 
vocabulary, absence of connectivity, extravagant claims, argument from authority, and lack of 
self-correction (e.g., Damer, 2013; Denault, 2015; Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008). However, 
whilst such cautionary advice may entice some individuals to raise questions regarding 
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ambiguous approaches, in practice, pseudoscientists can often provide what appear to be 
convincing counterarguments. Let us take the example of synergology.   
Synergology 
Synergology is a self-proclaimed “scientific discipline to read body language” 
(Synergology, The Official Website, n.d.a, our translation). Proponents of synergology, for 
example, have claimed that their approach allows individuals to be able to identify specific states 
of mind from nonverbal behaviour supposedly based upon the rigorous analysis of thousands of 
videos (e.g., Axelrad, 2012; Jarry, 2016, 2018; Moody, 2014; Turchet, 2012). Training sessions 
in synergology are offered to health, education, justice and security professionals by 
synergologists (individuals who receive 200-plus hours training in synergology) (e.g., 
Synergology, The Official Website, n.d.b). Recently, synergology has been marketed as a 
discipline to prevent terrorist attacks: 
Whether used for crowd monitoring, interrogation, videos analysis or through 
surveillance cameras, the observation of a suspect or of an interaction between people 
could prevent terrorist attacks, manage a crisis and more. Synergology’s analysis of non-
verbal behaviour is a logical complement to the important work of the various security 
officers in reading a threat. (Gagnon, 2018, para. 10) 
According to the founder of synergology, “Emotions hold a fundamental place in our 
lives as human beings. They are at the root of all our decisions, yet they are, paradoxically 
ignored by mainstream science” (Turchet, 2012, p. 17). Synergology, however, purports to offer 
a way to understand them: “Scratching the body or the face is an expression of repressed 
emotions” (Turchet, 2012, p. 150). For example, according to the founder of synergology, “The 
joints give flexibility to the body. The brain moves the hands there each time that the ability to 
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be or an interest in being flexible is questioned … When someone scratches the inside of the left 
elbow, the need to become flexible, to change the rhythm of the relationship, is tackled” 
(Turchet, 2012, p. 182-183). Synergology associate such meanings with all parts of the face and 
the body. However, to our knowledge, claims specific to synergology have not been subjected to 
peer-review and replication. When their approach is in the spotlight, however, proponents of 
synergology can be fairly proficient at counterarguments.  
Regarding the lack of falsifiability, proponents of synergology assert that claims specific 
to their approach are falsifiable, and therefore scientific (Quebec Association of Synergology, 
n.d.). This misuse of scientific vocabulary will not be apparent if members of the justice 
community do not know what falsifiability is (Popper, 1968). Falsifiability refers to theories or 
hypotheses which have the potential to be shown as false through contradictive statements or 
observation and is an essential component of the scientific method. This means that if the 
theories or hypothesis are not thoroughly justified, falsifiability cannot be demonstrated, and if 
they do not allow for testable predictions, they are not falsifiable (Popper, 1968).  
However, claims specific to synergology are not published in peer-reviewed papers. 
According to Philippe Turchet, the founder of synergology, and other synergologists, “a 
synergologist has no peer” (Jarry, 2016), so nobody but a synergologist can criticise 
synergology. Therefore, a statement regarding falsifiability is misleading, more so considering 
that falsifiability as a demarcation criterion is still debated (Pigliucci & Boudry, 2013a) and that 
pseudoscientists can offer falsifiable claims (e.g., graphologists) (Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008). 
This is more apparent when you consider that the founder of synergology also stated that “what 
we absolutely do not believe in within synergology is experiment, because body language is 
made in such a way that when we participate in an experiment, it does not work” (European 
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Institute of Synergology, 2015, our translation) and argued that “you can’t use replication when 
dealing with humans” (Jarry, 2016). 
Regarding the absence of connectivity, pseudoscientists can combine their claims with 
common sense and scientific assertions, which may suggest their theories or hypothesis were not 
developed in isolation (e.g., Denault & Jupe, 2017). For example, proponents of synergology 
regularly assert that one should not jump to conclusions whilst observing others (e.g., Moody, 
n.d.), something that has been advised by academics in the past (e.g., Ekman, 1992). However, 
they subsequently make extravagant claims such as the holding of your right hand with your left 
hand “indicates a control of the speech, a filtering of the words used and the rationalization of the 
emotion” (Gagnon, 2018, para. 8). Several other extravagant claims were made, such as “Our 
methods permit the detection of 80 percent of lies in this test called “guilty/innocent” … The 
success rate is 90 percent when people work in a group” (Turchet, 2012, p. 322).  
However, if judicial officers do not understand the science around the topic within 
training sessions they receive, these common sense and scientific assertions will likely appease 
suspicions of extravagant claims, more so if pseudoscientists describe it as a scientific discipline. 
This is even more likely if pseudoscientists refer to important practitioners and organisations to 
which they have provided the training sessions (Denault, Larivée, Plouffe, & Plusquellec, 2015). 
Although such an argument from authority should raise questions, it can also be quite persuasive 
to naïve observers. Ultimately, if pseudoscientists are questioned regarding their arguments from 
authority, retaliated statements can infer that academics are themselves using arguments from 
authority when they refer to peer-reviewed papers and that their criticism is unfounded, notably 
because their approach allegedly evolved, thus counteracting a supposed lack of self-correction 
(Denault, 2018). 
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In view of the foregoing, for dubious claims to be rejected by members of the judiciary, 
there needs to first be an understanding of what constitutes peer-reviewed papers. This includes 
an understanding of the publishing process; that is, how academics will empirically or 
theoretically study a specific aspect within the justice system, and then have their work 
scrutinised by members of the scientific community before and after it is published in a scientific 
journal (Ware, 2008).  
For example, after scientific academics have run an empirical study, it is then reported in 
a manuscript that is inclusive of all parts of their research process. They thoroughly explain in 
writing how they conducted their study, the results they obtained, how they carried out the 
analysis of their results, their conclusions but also any limitations of their analysis (Shipman, 
2014). The reasons for work being so rigorously reported is to allow readers to draw sound 
evaluative conclusions from a manuscript, considering any pitfalls the work may have, and to 
allow for replication; that is, can another researcher take the manuscript and run the same study 
again to either support or question the original findings? This is a critical part of the publishing 
process within psychological science (Asendorpf et al., 2013; Lindsay, 2015). The manuscript is 
subsequently submitted to a scientific journal, also known as a peer-reviewed journal, and 
subjected to a critical review from experts on the subject of the manuscript. Following the critical 
review, the manuscript may be rejected, the authors may be asked to revise and resubmit with 
major or minor amendments or it may be accepted for publication. Once a manuscript is 
accepted, it is then published in accordance with the journal specifications and becomes a peer-
reviewed paper. This is a process that has been adapted over the years to suit the ever-growing 
need for a stringent evaluation process (Spier, 2002). 
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It should be noted, however, that the publication process is lengthy at best. Scientific 
journals can take 3-6 months to undertake an initial review of a manuscript, and then depending 
on subsequent requests, a further 3-9 months for amendments and a further 3-6 months for 
publication. These are approximate figures, which will vary within disciplines and from one 
scientific journal to another. Rejection rates also differ between scientific journals. The 
American Psychological Association (APA) journals have an average rejection rate of 70%. For 
example, Psychological Review has a rejection rate of 86% and Professional Psychology: 
Research and Practice, a rejection rate of 56% (American Psychological Association, 2018).  
There are of course times where manuscripts are not reviewed by individuals with the 
specific credentials required (Elmore, 2017) and weakly founded articles do slip through into 
scientific journals, but such instances will likely decline with the recent transition to more open 
and transparent science (Open Science Collaboration, 2012). This allows other academics 
worldwide to evaluate peer-reviewed papers critically, provide commentary and in cases of 
serious misrepresentation, papers may be retracted. The humanities, however, have been shown 
to be one of the most stringent in terms of the peer review process (Huisman & Smits, 2017). 
Therefore, if judicial officers understand what peer-reviewed papers are, it is easier to reject 
approaches claimed to be “rigorous” or “scientifically founded”, but that were in fact never 
subject to the process of critical appraisal of knowledge. 
From the field to the laboratory and back to the field 
To appreciate the value of knowledge in peer-reviewed papers, one should also 
understand what comes prior to the publication process. Research by academics often starts in 
the laboratory, using willing participants and then moves into the field; that is, the techniques 
found to have solid empirical support in the laboratory are then evaluated within the justice 
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system itself. This often stems from problems previously identified within the field. A prime 
example of this is the Cognitive Interview (CI). After the RAND corporation evaluated the 
criminal investigation process, it was clear that the testimony given by witnesses was key in the 
collection and evaluation of evidence (Greenwood & Petersilia, 1975). From this, Geiselman, 
Fisher, MacKinnon and Holland (1986) developed the CI as a means to increase the accuracy of 
eyewitness memory. After a series of initial laboratory studies, the CI was then tested in the field 
(Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 1989) and has now become standard practice within police 
investigations and part of continuous development, including within the detection of deception 
(Dodson, Powers, & Lytell, 2015; Frosina et al., 2018; Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 
2015). Further examples of laboratory to field approaches include that of sex offender treatment 
programs (Friendship, Mann, & Beech, 2003; Brown, 2005), and violent offender treatment 
programs (Serin, Gobeil, & Preston, 2009). 
However, standard practices within police investigations can lack empirical evidence; 
that is, despite having been examined under the empirical magnifying glass, they may not have 
ben replicated, nor the findings supported. One primary example of this is the Behavioral 
Analysis Interview (BAI). The BAI claims to be similar to the CI but uses behaviour-provoking 
questions to try to elicit specific behavioural indications of a suspect’s guilt or innocence (Inbau, 
Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013). The BAI relies heavily on nonverbal and (para)linguistic cues 
that deception research has shown to be unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003). In addition, as noted 
by Vrij, Hope and Fisher (2014), a field study often cited in defence of the BAI was only able to 
establish ground truth in two out of 60 cases that were examined (Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 
1994). In addition, when empirically tested, studies have found the opposite of what the BAI 
claims to elicit from interviewees (Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006). It has also been shown to be 
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based upon little more than ‘common sense’ assumptions (Masip, Barba, & Herrero, 2012). A 
further example of a tool lacking empirical evidence referred to by Vrij, Hope and Fisher (2014), 
is that of ‘micro-expressions’ which are commonly used amongst practitioners within the 
detection of deception. Whilst micro-expressions were first introduced by Ekman (1992) as a 
symptomatic indication of ‘leakage’, there is no evidence that micro-expressions are valid cues 
to detect deception in real-time (Honts, Hartwig, Kleinman & Meisner, 2009) or that they occur 
often (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Furthermore, their use (nonverbal behaviour) could be 
detrimental to one’s ability to detect lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
The ‘anything goes’ nature of pseudoscience 
 Organisations within the justice system do use empirically or theoretically supported 
approaches (e.g., Leone, 2015; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). However, some implemented 
approaches lack empirical evidence. In more perturbing cases, police officers, lawyers and 
judges may resort to pseudoscience: that is, bodies of information that may appear to be 
scientific but, in reality, lack the characteristics of scientific knowledge (Lilienfeld, Lynn, & 
Lohr, 2014). As aforementioned, if members of the justice community are not advised about the 
publishing process, pseudoscientists can be fairly proficient at counterarguments. In addition, 
pseudoscientists can use several other fallacious arguments to achieve maximum support for 
their approaches.  
For example, pseudoscientists might argue that their approaches are supported by a select 
number of articles, theses, or books, and that they are reliable due to their acceptance by 
important organisations (Denault, Larivée, Plouffe, & Plusquellec, 2015). However, if upon 
reading such literature, it becomes apparent that there is no empirical or theoretical support, or 
that the steps leading to the conclusions are not thoroughly justified (be this methodologically or 
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through evaluation), the implementation of their approaches remains merely destitute of vision. 
In addition, such reference to important organisations – often known as ‘name dropping’ – is 
detrimental by nature. Doing so lends support to the notion that they might be unable to 
distinguish pseudoscience from science and may not understand the role that science plays in 
developing better professional practice. Fallacious arguments from pseudoscientists can also 
address negative comments in a way that attempts to prevent criticism from members of the 
scientific community. They can engage in ad hominem attacks, that is, opposition to an argument 
“by questioning the personal circumstances or personal trustworthiness of the arguer who 
advanced it.” (Walton, 1987, p. 317). For example, if academics raise concerns regarding a 
particular pseudoscience, having not attended its associated seminars, pseudoscientists might 
assert that the academic do not have the required understanding to be able to criticise, and as 
such, their criticism is of no value. If they did indeed attend the seminars, pseudoscientists might 
suggest that the academics raise concerns out of obscure or malicious reasons (Denault, 2018; 
Larivée, 2014; Shermer, 2002). Pseudoscientists might even state that they are criticised due to 
their revolutionary approach and refer to a quote dubiously attributed to the German philosopher 
Arthur Schopenhauer: “All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is 
violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as self-evident.” (Shallit, 2005). 
However, as Sagan (1979) rightly points out, “the fact that some geniuses were laughed 
at does not imply that all who are laughed at are geniuses. They laughed at Columbus, they 
laughed at Fulton, they laughed at the Wright brothers. But they also laughed at Bozo the 
Clown” (p. 75). Unfortunately, if organisations within the justice system encounter and use 
pseudoscientific approaches, the above fallacious arguments can still be as persuasive as 
counterarguments to criticism (Blancke, Boudry, & Pigliucci, 2017).  
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Although it would be a comfortable assumption to blame organisations within the justice 
system who resort to pseudoscience, such a conclusion would be far too simplistic. There is no 
clear guidance for police officers, lawyers and judges on how to recognise empirically driven, 
theoretically founded and peer-reviewed approaches from ambiguous ones. Moreover, if 
organisations within the justice system do not have access to empirically or theoretically 
supported approaches, and are turning to what is easily accessible, part of the responsibility lies 
with academics (Colwell, Miller, Miller, & Lyons, 2006; Denault et al., in press). If they do not 
adequately disseminate scientific knowledge or develop clear guidance on how to recognise what 
is and what is not science, it is not surprising that ‘nonscience’ finds its way to members of the 
justice community, the more so considering the large body of questionable information on 
forensic science being broadcast by popular media streams.   
Whilst there has been an influx of evidence-based practices within medicine being 
infiltrated into popular media, and thus the mainstream (Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, & 
Richardson, 1996), the same is not true for justice practices. In fact, television programs have 
contributed to distorted knowledge amongst the public, such as the CSI Effect (Byers & Johnson, 
2009; Schweitzer & Saks, 2007). The CSI Effect is commonly referred to as having had a 
detrimental effect on jurors’ arbitrary beliefs regarding forensic evidence. 
Prosecutors, judges and police officers have noted what they believe to be a 
so-called CSI effect whereby the popular television forensics programs have 
led jurors to have unreasonable expectations for the quality and quantity of 
physical evidence. (Houck, 2006, p. 86) 
In addition, evidence has suggested that watching the popular television series Lie to Me 
actually decreases individuals’ ability to detect deception (Levine, Serota, & Shulman, 2010). 
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The programme Lie to Me is heavily built upon the concept of micro-expressions as a tool to 
detect deception, which has little or no empirical support within the scientific literature (e.g., Vrij 
et al., 2017). Whilst such examples are not directly related to pseudoscience per se, they 
exemplify the ease with which questionable information is able to have a wide and unfavourable 
effect on the audience. 
Science or pseudoscience? A working example of nonverbal communication 
When a decision is required as to whether or not particular approaches should be 
presented to members of the justice community, an initial assessment should be required as to 
whether or not the concepts disseminated are in fact empirically driven, theoretically founded 
and peer reviewed. If the evidence which supports the approaches does not meet these 
requirements, or if the approaches have the potential to cause serious harm (e.g., Denault et al., 
in press), then questions should arise over their place within the justice system. However, 
counterarguments to criticism and fallacious arguments can appear compelling. Pseudoscience 
can seem logical and seem to be adequately supported. As Lakatos (1980) notes, even the most 
plausible and comprehensible statement may stem from pseudoscience whilst the most 
incomprehensible or confusing may be of high scientific significance: 
Thus a statement may be pseudoscientific even if it is eminently ‘plausible’ and 
everybody believes in it, and it may be scientifically valuable even if it is unbelievable 
and nobody believes in it. A theory may even be of supreme scientific value even if no 
one understands it, let alone believes in it. (Lakatos, 1980, p. 1) 
Therefore, before an initial assessment, police officers, lawyers and judges should be 
advised to refrain from too readily concluding that the approaches are scientifically valuable. 
This call to caution is all the more important considering pseudoscientists can combine their 
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claims with common sense and assertions (e.g., Denault & Jupe, 2017). However, if ambiguous 
approaches do find their way into the justice system, could this result in dire consequences?  
Let us take the example of a training session offered to judicial officers by a so-called 
expert. The approach asserts that different facial expressions and gestures are associated with 
particular states of mind, irrespective of the fact that there are no peer-reviewed papers that 
support such associations. Even if claims from the pseudoscientist appear to be extraordinary, 
any suspicion was appeased because of a reasonable underlying principle; a combination of 
scientific and pseudoscientific assertions gives the impression that the approach is grounded in 
science. For example, the so-called expert asserts that no single facial expression or gesture gives 
away lies, such as Pinocchio’s nose, an empirically supported assumption (Vrij, 2008), and that 
one should look for a combination of nonverbal cues and ask further questions to substantiate 
initial observations before making definitive conclusions as to whether or not someone is lying. 
However, whilst this advice may appear to be empirically driven, theoretically founded and peer-
reviewed, evidence suggests that it is not (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; 
Vrij, 2008). 
Since the 1960s, thousands of peer-reviewed papers have addressed the issue of 
nonverbal communication (Burgoon, Guerrero, & Floyd, 2016; Knapp, Hall, & Horgan, 2014; 
Moore, Hickson, & Stacks, 2014). The overall scientific consensus is that there is no cue akin to 
Pinocchio’s nose when it comes to detecting deception (Vrij, 2008). Of the cues that have been 
shown to have an association, the correlation is often weak (DePaulo et al., 2003). Therefore, the 
advice to look for a combination of nonverbal cues in face to face interactions, and to ask further 
questions, can be inadequate, and more importantly, unsafe during investigative interviews and 
trials. 
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For example, the pseudoscientist may assert that hiding the hands, scratching the nose, 
lowering the head, closing the mouth, and looking in specific directions are nonverbal indicators 
of deceit (Denault, 2015). However, many of these indicators stem from stereotypical beliefs 
regarding deceptive behaviours (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; The Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006). In fact, research suggests that indirect methods are more likely 
to result in higher accuracy rates when making deception judgements (ten Brinke, Stimson, & 
Carney, 2014; cf. Bond, Levine, & Hartwig, 2015). Furthermore, some individuals, whilst 
achieving quite high accuracy rates when making deception judgements, mention indicators that 
were not present during the interview they observed (Jupe, Akehurst, Vernham, & Allen, 2016). 
Therefore, considering there is no conclusive scientific evidence for the above indicators and that 
nonverbal indicators of deception are generally faint and invalid, decisions made by judicial 
officers by looking for a combination of nonverbal cues not supported by peer-reviewed 
evidence are likely to be inaccurate (Denault & Jupe, 2017; DePaulo et al., 2003; Otgaar & 
Howe, 2017).  
In addition, if members of the justice community ask further questions to substantiate 
their initial veracity judgments, they could unknowingly adapt their interaction to confirm their 
belief that witnesses, or suspects are lying. This is known as a confirmation bias; that is, “the 
seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a 
hypothesis in hand” (Nickerson, 1998, p. 175).  
For example, confirmation bias within investigative interviews often results in guilt-
presumptive questioning which, when listened to by independent evaluators, often leads to a self-
fulfilling bias (Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008). In addition, the initial presumption of guilt 
based upon questionable information, or even pseudoscience, may mean that those involved in 
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the investigative process fail to initiate dialogue with suspects which would enable the elicitating 
of verifiable (Nahari, 2018) or reliable forms of information (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). During 
trials, a confirmation bias can lead to erroneous credibility assessments (Porter & ten Brinke, 
2009; Porter, ten Brinke, & Gustaw, 2010). Considering that “Credibility is an issue that 
pervades most trials, and at its broadest may amount to a decision on guilt or innocence” (R. v. 
Handy, 2002, p. 951), the implementation of ambiguous approaches, or even pseudoscience, is 
also of serious concern. This manifestation of a confirmation bias can be totally unintended, but 
nevertheless can result in adverse human, social and economic consequences (Hill et al., 2008; 
Vrij et al., 2017). 
Conclusion: Evidence is not only a matter of investigation 
The aim of this article was to provide the justice system with an overview of what science 
is and what it is not, what constitutes empirically driven, theoretically founded and peer-
reviewed approaches, and how to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Whilst we have 
outlined the importance of empirically or theoretically supported approaches, there is no reason 
to question the intentions of most pseudoscientists. Advocates of pseudoscience often do so with 
the primary intention of assisting police officers, lawyers and judges. However, good faith is not 
a synonym of good practice. When approaches are implicitly or explicitly presented as scientific 
or when science is used as a backdrop to give them authenticity and influence, the justice system 
needs to acknowledge that evidence is not only a matter of investigation. Before the presentation 
of training sessions, police officers, lawyers and judges should systematically request and 
evaluate the supporting evidence. It is recommended that organisations within the justice system 
set up a joint advisory committee of academics and practitioners that would request and evaluate 
the supporting evidence of training sessions offered to police officers, lawyers and judges. This 
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would allow an assessment to be made as to whether approaches are in fact empirically driven, 
theoretically founded and peer-reviewed.  
Finally, the implementation of approaches that may appear to be scientific should initiate 
careful consideration, even if their subject matter is listed as a soft skill. “Soft skills are 
interpersonal qualities, also known as people skills, and personal attributes that one possesses” 
(Robles, 2012, p. 453). For example, one might intuitively believe a soft skill such as nonverbal 
communication has a lower value than several other skill sets. However, nonverbal 
communication can have a ubiquitous influence on a number of daily decisions made by police 
officers, lawyers and judges, including those made during investigative interviews and trials 
(e.g., Denault, 2015; Abbe & Brandon, 2014; Broaders & Goldin-Meadow, 2010). Therefore, 
organisations within the judicial system should be acutely aware of the importance of 
distinguishing pseudoscience from science and understanding the role that science plays in 
developing better professional practices. When thousands of peer-reviewed papers address a 
subject matter, the scientific knowledge should, at the very least, be understood and considered. 
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